Why Removing “Religious” from the Motivations Framework Is Both Legally Correct and Essential for Social Cohesion
Witness: Special Envoy to Combat Islamophobia, Mr Aftab Malik
Opening Statement
Monitor, I thank you for the opportunity to appear before this review. I do so in a spirit of national public interest. I want to be unambiguous from the outset about what my submission is.
So let me begin with clarity.
Every major faith tradition rejects violence committed in its name. Muslim Australians do not recognise acts of terror as an authentic expression of Islam. Jewish Australians do not recognise murder committed in the name of Judaism as reflective of their faith. Christian Australians reject atrocities committed under distorted biblical claims.
No faith community claims ownership of criminality.
The law must not, through inadvertence or design, construct categories of suspicion around religious or cultural identity.
We have seen this in court cases in Australia, with judges reflecting on purported bias to juries, including the assessment of an accused’s dress, their beard, their desire to adjourn for prayer’, or despite ISIS propaganda motivating defendants, we have seen a judge vigorously attribute their motives to ‘the ideology of Islam.’
As the former Independent National Security Legislation Monitor has previously warned, requiring proof of a religious motive risks coming dangerously close to pursuing a case against a religion itself.
That should concern all of us.
While some have defended the inclusion of religion on the basis that the current definition is framed neutrally, the application of this definition has had a disproportionate impact on Muslim Australians.
Other defenders of the current definition argue that removing the word “religious” could allow an accused person to claim that their motivation was purely religious and therefore fall outside the definition of terrorism.
But this misunderstands the nature of extremist violence.
We know that extremism occurs due to a wide range of factors. These include social isolation, undiagnosed mental health problems, and a response to a perceived sense of injustice and humiliation.
This has been reaffirmed by a range of Australian think-tanks, researchers, and academics.
However, there appears to be a fixation on religion as the cause of extremism.
And yet, there is no religious justification for terrorism. None.
The Prophet Muhammad himself unequivocally warned: “extremists are doomed.”
He also called out violent extremists, by saying: “They shall call to the Book of God, though they do not belong to it.”
Contrary to popular perception, empirical evidence states that Islam actually insulates against extremism.
Individuals convicted of terrorism offences repeatedly demonstrate profound religious illiteracy. They lack basic theological knowledge.
a very limited role.”
What drives them is not religion.
It is ideology — a political project wrapped in religious symbolism.
When we describe acts of terror as religious, we misidentify the problem.
Terrorist organisations actively seek recognition as the authentic representatives of Islam. Their recruitment depends on that narrative.
When states adopt the same framing — even inadvertently — they strengthen the ideological claim extremists are trying to make.
But the consequences extend further.
The legal framing of terrorism as religious has downstream effects across investigative practice, judicial reasoning, deradicalization programs, and community engagement.
Each instance of high-profile terrorism described as “religiously motivated,” produces a measurable surge in Islamophobia; a direct consequence of the legal and political conflation of Islam with terrorism.
When the law symbolically embeds religion within terrorism as religious, it legitimises that association.
It also permits people to conflate Islam with terrorism, and the consequences have been horrifying and material for Muslims, as well as for social cohesion.
Post-Bondi, across mainstream media, political discourse and online spaces, this conflation has created a “permission to hate” Muslims, which resulted in a surge of anti-Muslim sentiment — a staggering 740 per cent increase in reported incidents in the fortnight following the Bondi attack.
These Islamophobic attacks against Muslims, reveal four entrenched narratives, consolidated by the idea that Islam equals terrorism. They are:
- Islam is culturally incompatible with Australian values
- Islam is violent
- Muslims are a threat
- Islam is monolithic
Hyper-securitisation leads Muslim Australians to retreat from public life, self-censor, and experience heightened anxiety and fear.
This retreat damages not only Muslim wellbeing, but the quality of Muslim civic participation; the engagement with democratic institutions and processes that is the foundation of social cohesion.
This brings us to the central question before this review.
What difference would removing the word “religious” make?
It would send a clear signal that Australian law targets violence and coercion, not belief.
That the state recognizes religion as distinct from extremist ideology.
And that Muslim Australians are not presumptive suspects within the legal architecture of national security.
Law is not merely operational. It is symbolic. It communicates what a society values, who it trusts, and who it suspects.
The word “religious” in Australia’s terrorism definition has sent an unambiguous signal to Muslim Australians: your faith, and by extension, you, are associated in law, with violence.
Removing “religious” from the definition would send a different signal:
that the state trusts Muslim Australians as partners in democracy, not as subjects of exceptional scrutiny.
This is a small legislative change with a potentially transformative impact on social cohesion.
Let me conclude with this; removing religious motivation from the definition of terrorism would not weaken national security. It will strengthen it.
It would:
- Improve legal precision
- Reduce structural stigmatisation
- Strengthen institutional legitimacy, and
- Reinforce social cohesion
After 25 years of securitized framing, recalibration would signal that the state has listened.
That is the proposition before us.
Thank you.
Watch the full public hearing on Vimeo, (skip to 22:01:23): INSLM Day 2 - Public Hearing – Defining terrorism: Review of the definition of a ‘Terrorist Act’ in section 100.1 of the Criminal Code Act 1995